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Calculating without numbers: Aesthetic governmentality in Delhi’s slums  
 
D. Asher Ghertner 
 
Abstract:  
This paper looks at the manner in which knowledge of slums in Delhi has been collected, assembled and 
circulated in two different moments of urban improvement to explore the relationship between 
calculation and governmentality. Based on an extended study of slum enumeration and the politics of 
slum demolitions in Delhi, I show that each of these two moments relied on an epistemologically 
different set of calculative practices—one statistical, the other aesthetic—to render the slum intelligible 
and secure rule. I specifically show how the statistically rigorous calculative practices of the first moment 
encountered various technical difficulties and political challenges in producing a governing intelligibility, 
thus leading to the unruliness of slum space. In response, a new set of governmental techniques 
operating through the dissemination of aesthetic norms and codes re-secured rule over slums. I describe 
this shift in governmental technique to demonstrate that the dissemination of aesthetic norms can be 
both more governmentally effective and practically implementable than the statistical deployment of 
governmental truths. This suggests the need to expand our understanding of the epistemology of 
government to include attention to a more diverse array of governmental technologies, some more 
aesthetic than strictly calculative.  
 
 
Keywords: governmentality, India, counter-conduct, calculation, law, visuality
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I. Introduction 
Urban government in Delhi today is marked by a conspicuous absence of accurate and up to date 
statistics and maps. Yet, governmental programs there, even without these standard instruments of 
‘rational’ planning, effectively ‘conduct the conduct’ of the population (see Foucault, 2007). How? In this 
paper, I will explore the relationship between governmentality and calculation through an analysis of the 
politics of calculating, seeing and rendering knowable Delhi’s slums through various governmental 
programs over the past twenty years. Such programs, as I will show, provide a useful lens for rethinking 
many of the epistemological assumptions and limitations that underlie current thinking about the practice 
of government. Specifically, I will show how governmentality can operate as effectively through aesthetic 
norms as it does through those ‘scientifically rational’ and statistical processes of knowledge assembly 
widely discussed in the literature. Attention to these aesthetic modes of governing is particularly relevant 
for the study of postcolonial contexts, where even if rigorous statistical knowledge exists, it is often 
missing, forged, or unused (see Hull, 2008; Roy, 2004).   
Government, ‘understood in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing human 
behavior,’ (Foucault, 1997: 82) functions by constructing and making intelligible categories of knowledge 
that were previously unintelligible and authorizing those categories through expert ‘truths.’ By investing 
these intelligible categories (e.g. the rate of economic growth, the occurrence of a disease) with 
significance and problematizing them such that they appear to require improvement via technical 
intervention, governmental programs recruit the diverse desires of individuals into a shared normative 
framework. Such programs are effective to the extent that they produce governable subjects—individuals 
who evaluate and act upon the social world through lenses provided by government. An essential 
component of guiding the interests of target population groups is thus the joint exercise of crafting 
intelligible fields for governmental intervention and problematizing such fields so as to make certain 
‘deficiencies’ emerge as improvable.i  
The starting point for this paper is to examine the calculative practices, or the techne, through 
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which governmental programs construct intelligible fields for intervention. This follows from one of 
Foucault’s strongest methodological recommendations that power be studied through an ascending 
analysis, which requires attention to ‘the actual instruments that form and accumulate knowledge, the 
observational methods, the recording techniques, the investigative research procedures, the verification 
mechanisms. That is, the delicate mechanisms of power cannot function unless knowledge, or rather 
knowledge apparatuses, are formed, organized, and put into circulation’ (Foucault, 2001: 33-4). This 
focus on the micro-practices of knowledge formation, or calculative practices, demands attention to the 
diverse forms in which knowledge is consolidated and used to craft grids of intelligibility: how 
governmental programs use carefully selected metrics to assess and assign value and meaning to their 
targets. This means the calculative practices at play in any moment not only establish the technical 
requirements of government, but also form a calculative foundation of rule—the epistemological basis on 
which information is gathered, knowledge assembled, and ‘truths’ verified so as to guide and manage a 
population’s interests. Different calculative practices thus give rise to different calculative foundations, or 
epistemologies, of government; this is the relationship I explore herein. 
 In the following pages, I look at the manner in which knowledge of slums in Delhi has been 
collected, assembled and circulated in two different moments of urban improvement. Specifically, I show 
that each of these two moments relied on an epistemologically different set of calculative practices to 
render the slum intelligible and secure rule: the first statistical and the second aesthetic. I begin in Section 
II by defining the primary calculative practice used to render the slum intelligible in the post-
Independence period: the slum survey. In addition to its function as a technique of sovereign power used 
to know and control the territory, the slum survey since 1990 (the beginning of the first moment of 
urban improvement) took on the new governmental role of recruiting slum dwellers’ desires into 
alignment with the vision of a ‘modern,’ orderly city. That is, the slum survey became what Foucault calls 
a ‘security apparatus’: a governmental technology used to improve the population’s welfare and minimize 
‘what is risky and inconvenient’ (Foucault, 2007: 19), in this case by using numerical representations of 
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the slum to guide slum dwellers through programs of self-improvement. The slum survey in this first 
moment thus follows the ‘rule of evidence’ and has the ‘scientificity’ Foucault (2007: 350-1) described in 
his lectures on governmentality, and resembles the statistical procedures for ‘turning the objects of 
government into numericized inscriptions’ (Rose, 1991: 676) widely discussed in the governmentality 
literature. 
 In Section III, I examine how the calculative foundation of this first moment lost its functional 
efficiency, became ill-suited to secure the desired ends of government, and thus provoked a political 
response by opening a space for counter-conduct, an example of which I consider in Section IV. 
Specifically, a community group used a counter-survey exercise to challenge the truthfulness of the slum 
survey and forced a reconfiguration of how slum space is calculated and rendered intelligible. 
 In order to re-secure the conditions for rule and overcome such counter-conduct, a new calculative 
foundation emerged around 2000—the beginning of the second moment—that introduced a new regime 
of knowing in Delhi. Here, the visuality of urban space—which includes the territory as well as its 
population and built environment—would become the key metric of that space’s legal and moral 
standing, which I describe in Section V. The slum survey continues to operate as the key governmental 
technology in this moment, only its mode of gathering and conveying information has radically shifted. 
No longer implemented to accurately assess slum space, the survey becomes more of an aesthetic and 
narrative technique to train slum dwellers to see different types of urban space as either desirable or 
deplorable based on their outward appearance. This ‘aesthetic governmentality’ marks a shift in the 
calculative basis of rule away from scientific survey practices and toward an aesthetic normativity, which 
I detail in Section VI.  
 My goal in describing how the calculative practices of government shifted between these two 
moments is threefold: first, to demonstrate how the calculative foundation of government can change 
within an overall rationality of rule (e.g. urban improvement or slum removal); second, to argue that the 
calculative practices of government provide a particularly supple site, prone to what Foucault (2007) calls 
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counter-conduct and thus larger reconfigurations of rule; and third, to gesture to a type of aesthetic 
governmentality that has not been explicitly theorized in the governmentality literature. I return to the 
implications of these claims, especially as they relate to postcolonial governmentality, in a concluding 
discussion in Section VII. 
 
II. Calculating slums—the slum survey 
 
 In 1950, the Government of India appointed a committee to address Delhi’s pressing social and 
demographic strains (Legg, 2006b), which had been exacerbated by the doubling of the city’s population 
due to the flood of families arriving from Pakistan after Partition in 1947 (Pandey, 2001: 122). One of the 
committee’s main findings, which set the conditions in which the Delhi Development Authority (DDA), 
Delhi’s main land management body, would take shape seven years later, was the need to increase the 
quantum of ‘scientific knowledge’ and calculative accuracy in building and regulating the city, especially 
its dilapidated, overly congested, and unhygienic slum spaces (Sharan, 2006: 4906). This goal of forming a 
scientifically rational and ‘accurate’ description of the territory and population defined the calculative 
foundation of the government of slums for the first fifty years of independence. The primary calculative 
practice that backed this overall form of government was the slum survey.  
 In common parlance, slums are areas with sub-standard housing whose residents do not formally 
own or lease the land on which they reside.ii This land can be private or, more often, public. Because the 
DDA is by far the largest land-owning agency in Delhi, the majority of slums (700 out of 1080 as of 
2002)iii are located on land that it manages. Whereas the Public Premises Act, 1971 defines the 
procedures for the removal of unauthorized occupants of public land, the actual basis on which slums 
are surveyed and assessed is located in the guidelines of the DDA and other land-owning agencies. 
Within the DDA, the Land Department is assigned the task of preventing encroachments and securing 
exclusive control over land that the DDA has taken into its possession for urban development. The 
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origin of surveying slums thus lies in the territorial exercise of sovereign power.iv 
 The procedures for monitoring public land and encroachments thereupon are primarily the 
responsibility of the DDA’s and State Revenue Department’s field staff. The first step in this process is 
the identification of encroachments. After a field staff, during regular field visits, finds that a particular 
portion of DDA land is unauthorizedly occupied, he is to (a) report such an occupation to the revenue 
collection officer charged with overseeing the given plot in the Revenue Department and (b) ‘keep a 
record of all such reports in the form of a register’ (DDA, 1987: 1). This register includes the nature of 
the encroachment, the existing use of the land, the Revenue Department cadastral number, the extent of 
the encroachment on the mentioned plot(s), the name of the encroacher, the number of occupants of the 
land, and the approximate date of encroachment, among other details of the land. The revenue collectors 
then maintain estate-wise registers by recording the same information into a chart tabulated according to 
the cadastral map and also make further independent, local enquiries to determine the status of the 
reported encroachments (ibid.: 1). If the information passed to the revenue collector by the DDA field 
staff is confirmed, he forwards the information in a written report to the Estate Officer located above 
him in the Revenue Department. Before reaching the Estate Officer, who initiates proceedings against 
the encroacher, at least two independent field visits by two different officers from two different 
government departments are conducted to physically assess the nature of the encroachment.  
 By this point, however, the encroachment will only have been identified and registered. Before any 
particular encroachment case is disposed of, the Estate Officer must send a monthly report to a more 
senior officer to approve the reporting of the land use scenario in his area. During this process, if ‘an 
Estate Officer is satisfied that a large number of squatters at a particular site remain unsurveyed, due to 
one reason or another, he may propose a special survey’ to this senior officer in which multiple 
encroachments are assessed together (ibid.: 3). This would be the third comprehensive survey of the land 
and encroaching population. Concurrently, the field staff is to issue a ‘show cause notice’, along with a 
certified extract of the encroachment file and the Estate Officer’s order, to the encroacher by returning 
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to the physical site and affixing the notice on the encroaching structure. During these steps, the 
Guidelines state that ‘Every care should be taken to see that the calculations are correct and the notices 
have been filled correctly and completely’, which could require further field visits (ibid.: 4).  
 Through a minimum of three site visits, with the likelihood of more visits to confirm the details of 
the land assessment across departments, the Estate Officer assembles a detailed (and ‘accurate’) 
‘assessment register’ that consists of an up-to-date index of all encroachments and the status of the 
proceedings against them. All of this sets up the calculative requirements and expectations of the 
sovereign's knowledge of, and control and regulation over, public land and encroachments thereupon. 
This system of land oversight—which has the ‘scientificity’ Foucault (2007: 351) discusses in his 
treatment of statistics and, following Porter (1995), might be described as ‘mechanically objective’v—has 
been in place, roughly in this form, since the DDA was established in 1957.  
 However, for much of this period, compiling such an accurate account of land occupation was 
difficult because slum residents viewed the slum survey as something to be avoided. As a technology of 
sovereign power, which functions by ‘laying down a law and fixing a punishment for the person who 
breaks it’ (Foucault, 2007, 5), the slum survey operated by defining a legal norm and penalizing all those 
who did not comply with it. Slum residents outside this norm, therefore, had no incentive to participate 
in the survey (and thus enter the ambit of the law) and did all they could to avoid, divert, or postpone its 
implementation. According to surveyorsvi, some of their sabotage tactics included: removing public 
notices (which the surveyors are legally required to display before initiating the survey process) and then 
refusing to be surveyed on the basis of the absence of a written notice, disappearing on survey days, and 
bribing clerks and low-level field staff to void their names and locations from the survey register. Slum 
dwellers’ ability to continue land occupancy was contingent upon exclusion from government records—i.e. 
they had an informal, ‘paralegal’ tenure status operating outside the privileged domain of ‘civil society’ 
(Chatterjee, 2004)—which undercut the state’s ability to collect accurate statistical summaries of the 
territory.  
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 Therefore, despite the regulatory requirement to maintain comprehensive knowledge over all 
public land and prevent permanent encroachments, more than 900 slum clusters were settled in Delhi by 
1990.vii The task of regulating such massive and complex informal settlements exclusively through 
penalties and laws proved too great for the administrative and political apparatuses of the time. Just as 
Foucault found in the shift from sovereign to governmental power that ‘too many things were escaping 
the old mechanism of the power of sovereignty,’ causing an ‘adjustment’ toward the disciplinary and 
security mechanisms (Foucault, 2001, 249), so too in Delhi did the juridical mechanism face limitations 
that required the rise of new technologies of power. Thus, in 1990 the government transformed how it 
would implement the slum survey. No longer simply for the maintenance of control of land (sovereign 
power), it would be put to a different use: to render a picture of slums that could be diagnosed and 
improved upon. That is, knowledge of slums would no longer be used exclusively to form a centralized 
database of state land, but also put into circulation in an attempt to positively conduct the conduct of the 
slum population by creating new incentives and presenting clear depictions of how this population could 
be aligned (‘regularized’ or ‘normalized’ in Foucault’s words) with the rest of the property-owning 
society. It did so by directing calculations of the territory toward the constitution of a different type of 
slum subject: the slum dweller not just as an ‘illegal,’ but also a citizen eligible for relocation and (self-
)improvement. 
 This change in the character of the slum survey took place largely through the efforts of the 
government of V.P. Singh, India’s then new Prime Minister who in 1989 began implementing a range of 
aggressive social justice programs (Jaffrelot, 2003: Ch. 10). Taking note of the burgeoning slum 
population in Delhi and the failure of previous slum programs to abate slum growth, Singh initiated the 
city’s first comprehensive slum survey to register and (partially) legalize all slum dwellers (Mustafa, 1995). 
Making use of existing survey techniques and field staff, this four-month-long exercise enumerated every 
slum household in Delhi and issued what came to be known as V.P. Singh tokens. The purpose of the 
V.P. Singh token was to provide slum dwellers with formal proof of residence, but the incentive for slum 
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dwellers to partake in the survey and actively self-identify as ‘encroachers’ was tied to the introduction of 
a new governmental object: resettlement.  
 The V.P. Singh token gave token-holding slum dwellers a permanent right to live in the city, 
defining all registered slum families as Delhi residents and formalizing their right to resettlement in case 
their slum was removed. At the time of a slum demolition, therefore, any slum family that could prove it 
had resided in Delhi since before 1990—most easily by showing a V.P. Singh token—was entitled to a 
government-issued resettlement plot. To slum dwellers, however, resettlement meant much more than 
the right to the city. Resettlement was also seen as a means to escape the stigmatized space of the slum 
and was thus viewed as a pathway to improvement. 
 A complex mix of government rhetoric, popular history, and personal desire informed slum 
dwellers’ conceptualization of resettlement through most of the 1990s. Early, targeted slum resettlement 
actions carried out during Indira Gandhi’s rule as Prime Minister in the 1970s and early 1980s came to be 
viewed by slum dwellers as a best-case scenario. In these limited resettlement drives, slum dwellers were 
usually relocated within a five kilometre radius of their previous settlements and given well-serviced and 
relatively large plots, free of cost, on a permanent leasehold basis. Such resettlement sites have since been 
developed and integrated into the surrounding residential areas, bearing little to no visual distinction with 
the neighbouring, middle class residential colonies.viii Due to financial and space constraints, the terms of 
resettlement were far less favourable by the early 1990s, and less than a third of displaced slum families 
were receiving resettlement plots by the late 1990s.ix Yet, the DDA and Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
(MCD) still actively perpetuated (and continue to perpetuate) the perception of resettlement as a positive 
process through media campaigns and the slum survey, as we shall see.  
 Since the introduction of resettlement rights in 1990, the slum survey is initiated only after the 
DDA determines that a piece of encroached land is needed for a public purpose, at which time it issues a 
notice to the residents of the specified land alerting them that a survey exercise will be carried out on a 
forthcoming date.x On that date, a survey team consisting of at least ten field staff descends upon the 
Gheter, D.A. (2010). ‘Calculating without numbers,’ Economy and Society 39(2): 185-217. 
 9 
settlement and sets up camp in a clear, central area. Once the residents have assembled, the chief officer 
displays a map, tells residents what the intended use of the land shown on the map is, and states that this 
use has been hindered by the presence of the slum. Be it a school, public park, or road, the map shows 
the slum as ‘out of place.’ He thus begins by depicting the slum as an illegal encroachment, clearly 
violating the official land use laid down according to planning procedures. In addition to highlighting the 
technical deficiency of the slum population—its infraction of the land use plan and its residents’ lack of 
property ownership—the officers describe a possible means by which residents can escape the label 
‘illegal’: by following the procedures of the survey, government will improve eligible slum dwellers by 
resettling them to serviced plots, thus removing their deficiencies and furnishing the conditions necessary 
for ‘normal’ urban life. Only by following the enumerative steps of the survey, residents are told, will 
resettlement be provided.  
 The officer follows by describing the procedures by which resettlement eligibility will be assessed. 
Residents have to collect all forms of their residence proof (e.g. ration cards, identity cards, voter cards, 
V.P Singh tokens) and have them ready when the officers reach their houses. Next, they have to remain 
present at their homes so that their family can be registered, display their pre-1990 residence proof, 
demonstrate a legitimate (non-commercial) use of the land, and have their house inscribed with a survey 
number and recorded on a chart. Finally, they have to wait in line after the entire settlement has been 
enumerated and have their residence proof scrutinized by the chief officer, who adds the family to a list 
of those either ‘eligible’ or ‘ineligible’ for resettlement. In slums whose demolition is imminent, residents 
who are added to the former list (and thus deemed ‘improvable’) have to sign a piece of paper agreeing 
to the terms of resettlement, which include paying a sum of money and abiding by certain land use and 
site development norms. These calculated steps aim to ‘render technical’ (Li, 2007; Rose, 1999) the 
complex ‘slum problem’ by depicting slum ‘improvement’/resettlement as a procedural, not political, 
exercise. Bracketing off the question of whether the slum should be removed or not, the survey 
concentrates attention on resettlement eligibility, the success or failure of which is placed upon the 
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internal dynamics, desires and practices of the slum population itself.  
 During the course of the survey process, the survey team compiles preliminary summaries of 
households according to three categories: eligibile, ineligibile, and ambiguous. Residents become aware of 
these overall numbers as well as their own classification status. Households marked ‘ineligible’ or 
‘ambiguous’ thereafter attempt to provide further proof or bargain otherwise to enter the ‘eligible’ 
category. Community leaders are often called into this negotiation process, out of which some 
reconfiguration of the final numbers emerges. Because resettlement is something many residents desire—
either over and above continued habitation in their slum or in recognition that they are better off being 
resettled than risking protest against the demolition—slum residents see the act of being enumerated and 
registered as a positive technology, something to be promoted and worth struggling to attain, unlike the 
pre-1990 survey, which slum residents ardently avoided. The first effect of the post-1990 survey, then, is 
to draw slum residents into the practice of government by soliciting interest in the survey process: the 
introduction of the right to resettlement achieves this. Second, it fosters the slum population’s desire for 
resettlement—that is, the desire to be deemed permanent and legal by the state and public—by (a) 
identifying a deficiency within the slum (its violation of law, its lack of recognition by the state and 
general public), and (b) depicting resettlement as an attainable and desirable means to remove that 
deficiency. In doing so, the survey also encourages slum residents to identify as eligible resettlees, 
‘encroachers,’ or other terms provided by government. Third, by bifurcating the slum population into 
‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ categories and providing a statistical distribution of the slum’s makeup according 
to these categories, the survey divides the interests of the slum population. In the majority of instances, 
residents ‘eligible’ for resettlement do not resist displacement, instead viewing it as an inevitable step in 
the city’s and their own personal development: why oppose the demolition when they are the lucky few 
granted resettlement? This reduces the number of residents likely to directly oppose slum clearance.  
 The sovereign exercise of enumerating the territory and its population, described above, thus 
changed roles as it became wrapped up with resettlement. Whereas before, slum surveys were supposed 
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to take place whenever there was a land encroachment (to enforce a juridical norm), in 1990 the DDA 
began to try to work through the interests of slum dwellers to achieve a delicate balance between forced 
displacement and voluntary resettlement. Illegality thus became something not to be prohibited, but 
managed. However, while the new uses of the slum survey in this first moment of urban improvement 
were programmatically aimed at more effectively guiding the slum population toward voluntary 
dislocation, the survey’s authority rested upon its ability to both (a) accurately assess slum residents’ 
history and location, and (b) convince residents that its metrics for evaluating slum space were the most 
relevant and ‘truthful.’ By 2000, both of these requirements proved beyond the technical means of 
government.   
 
III. Statistics’ loss of authority: unruliness in Delhi in the early 2000s 
 
 The slum survey has governmental authority and effect, ostensibly, on the basis of an accurate 
knowledge of slum space. Like other instruments of scientific planning, it is expected to collate complex 
ground realities into simplified trends and patterns from which deficiencies and programs of 
improvement can be identified. However, securing this ‘level of functional efficiency’ (Legg, 2007) 
requires adhering to specific norms of accuracy and process. As Legg says, summarizing Hannah’s (2000) 
discussion of the functional requirements of statistics and mapping:  
 
A sufficient infrastructure had to exist to enable the ‘abstraction’ by which the 
complex world became accessible. Second, this world had to be subject to an 
efficient process of ‘assortment’ such that it was known through rigorous and 
reliable categories. Third, the information had to be ‘centralized’ and analysed by an 
active and efficient state (2007, 154). 
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However, practically, these technical requirements became increasingly difficult for the state to fulfil in 
the 1980s and 1990s. Compare the above prerequisites for functional efficiency with the actual condition 
of information in the DDA: 
 
The information system in the DDA is characterised by a ‘data explosion’ at the 
lower levels and ‘information starvation’ at the higher levels of management. There 
is little consolidation or analysis being carried out at any level of the DDA. Even 
senior officers receive information in the form of raw data. In the absence of the 
data being processed and presented as information, officials are unable to use it as a 
decision-making tool, thereby defeating the very purpose for which the data was 
gathered.xi 
 
This shows that there is a certain administrative burden of statistical simplification, which the DDA had 
been struggling to surmount. Thus, despite a series of ‘objective’ survey practices to monitor urban 
space—a type of calculation clearly ‘scientific in its procedures,’ which Foucault (2007: 350) considered 
‘absolutely indispensable for good government’—the DDA had great difficulty assembling information 
into a coherent calculability. More than this secondary step of translating data into a usable form though, 
the DDA’s ability to collect accurate ground data in the first place was questionable. In 1986, the DDA 
commissioned its first ever institutional review by an external body, the final report for which shows the 
absence within the DDA of a coordinated set of calculative practices. The report, completed by Tata 
Consultancy Services, stated that ‘Consultants observed that the present information system is 
characterised by i) missing information links between functional areas… and v) low reliability of 
information’ and noted that DDA data is generally typified by a ‘lack of accuracy’. Related specifically to 
knowledge of land, the report found information inadequacies in areas including the ‘inventory of the 
land with the DDA’, the ‘status of land development’ thereupon, and the ‘extent of land misuses.’xii 
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Nonetheless, rule over slums until around 2000 continued to be exercised on the presumption of 
scientific rigor and accurate statistics.  
 By 2000, the governmental approach to monitoring and surveying slums became part of the 
explicit governmental goal of turning Delhi into a ‘slum free city’, giving it a ‘world-class’ look, 
promoting an efficient land market, and converting the ‘under-utilized’ public land occupied by slum 
dwellers into commercially exploitable private property (DDA, 1997). These were all part of the policies 
of economic liberalization initiated by the Finance Ministry in 1991 and concretely implemented in Delhi 
in the late 1990s (Ghertner, 2005; A.K. Jain, 2003). However, by this time, it had become clear to the 
city’s ‘governors’ that the pace and efficiency of slum clearance and resettlement in Delhi was insufficient 
to achieve these ends. The slum population had continued to grow after 1990, increasing from 260,000 
families in 1990 to 480,000 by 1995, with the number of slum clusters during the same period rising from 
929 to 1,080.xiii To address the ‘menace of illegal encroachment’ and slumsxiv, middle class neighbourhood 
associations and civic groups began turning to the courts in search of faster, sterner relief. Civic and 
environmental problems like solid waste disposal, park maintenance, traffic congestion, land use 
violations, and ‘the problem of the slum’ had been administered by complex assemblages of 
governmental and regulatory technologies that operated through the branches of the state, non-
governmental organizations and civic groups, local politicians’ patron-client relations, and market forces. 
In the late 1990s, they were suddenly brought into the domain of the judiciary.xv  
 The courts, noting how unruly (i.e. slummy) the city was becoming, took cognizance of ‘the 
dismal and gloomy picture of such jhuggi/jhopries [slum huts] coming up regularly’ across the city and 
said that ‘on account of timely actions not having been taken, the Jhuggi clusters [slums] have been 
multiplying each year.’xvi The courts began addressing this situation through a flurry of decisions in the 
late 1990s that rebuked the DDA for failing to both remove existing slums and prevent fresh slums from 
coming up: the ‘DDA has not been able to protect its land.’xvii The court’s initial response was to register 
its dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the DDA calculative process and insist that the DDA follow 
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its mandate of preventing fresh encroachments: ‘We reiterate that the land owning agencies… shall 
ensure that no new Jhuggi comes up….’xviii In a later judgment, the court took note of the unruliness 
created by the DDA’s inability to secure control over its land by (rhetorically) questioning the foundation 
of sovereignty over slum spaces: ‘It is thus contended that there is no purpose in acquiring the land when 
the authorities are unable to protect the land already acquired which has been encroached.’xix But, the 
court returned to affirm that sovereign authority and control of slum space could not be evaded: ‘DDA 
cannot wish away its liability to clear the encroachments on public lands….’xx 
The first means the court adopted to re-secure sovereignty was to order the DDA to better 
follow its own calculative procedures. It did so by reaffirming the DDA’s statutory duty to implement 
the Delhi Master Plan, requesting detailed information on occupied land in pending cases, and 
threatening to levy penalties and hold responsible officers in contempt of court. However, as the menace 
of slums persisted and the DDA (along with other accountable authorities) only partially adhered to the 
court’s orders, the court deemed the calculative efforts of the DDA a failure and began appointing its 
own special committees and court commissioners to do ground-level field assessments in place of the 
DDA.xxi The court’s goal was to more efficiently implement the existing survey-based calculative 
practicesxxii—that is, it did not fault the existing techne, just those responsible for implementing it.  
But, producing accurate calculations capable of guiding the population and administering the law 
required extensive field knowledge of not only the current ground reality, but also the history of such 
spaces. These court-appointed surveyors ended up producing equally (or more) flawed calculations of the 
ground reality, as was pointed out by a civil writ petition contesting a court committee’s recommendation 
to demolish a slum in north Delhi:  
 
… it is apparent that the inspection and scrutiny performed by the Learned Court 
Commissioner appears, at best, perfunctory… [and contains] marked discrepancies 
about the area and size of the basti [slum]… [The Committee’s report] is also 
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incomplete, cursory and factually inaccurate. [The letter by the Court 
Commissioner] requests the Court to give directions for removal of encroachments 
without clarifying what are considered encroachments.... further the Monitoring 
Committee also differs from the Learned Court Commissioner in its assessment of 
the size of the basti... the authorities appear to be unclear even to the extent and 
demarcation of the land area in question - the land of two Khasras [plots] (110, 111) 
are shown in the Revenue record as merely Government land, without designating a 
specific land owning agency.xxiii  
 
The petition concludes by saying the question of ‘urgent public use,’ which is the justification for the 
slum demolition, cannot even arise because ‘the dimensions of the land and its precise ownership are 
itself indeterminate….’ 
 We thus find that by 2000, through a combination of an increasingly complex and unruly ground 
situation and the inability of existing calculative practices to render that ground sufficiently intelligible to 
the courts and upper-level bureaucrats, the overall governmental goal of slum removal was opened to 
counter-claims and tactics. This unruliness or intractability was not, however, solely the outcome of 
technical deficiencies of rule. Unruliness, that is to say, is not necessarily an effect of government—i.e. a 
failure internal to governmental practice; it can also be an effect on government—a calculated ‘struggle 
against the processes implemented for conducting others’, what Foucault calls ‘counter-conduct’ (2007, 
201). Unruliness, then, is not simply that which escapes governmental knowledge; it can also be a 
product of contestation or counter-conduct, as I will show below. While governmental knowledge is 
necessarily incomplete (Burchell, 1991), the manner in which that knowledge is organized and circulated 
is not independent of the practice of politics. Rather, the limitations of governmental knowledge can also 
mobilize people ‘to contest the truths in the name of which they are governed, and to change the 
conditions under which they live’ (Li, 2007: 17-9). 
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IV. Calculated counter-conduct 
 
 One clear example of how political practices destabilized the prevailing calculative foundation of 
rule in Delhi arose in 2003 in the context of a slum survey. Since the early 1990s, the Dilli Shramik 
Sangathan (DSS), or Delhi Labour Organization, a slum organization operating in West Delhi, had been 
actively following and contesting various attempts by neighbouring property owners, local politicians, 
and the DDA to demolish the slums in which its members resided. In August 2003, the DDA entered 
two DSS slums and began a slum survey, saying that the slums would be cleared in the near future. DSS, 
being made up of residents of these slums and having worked and lived there for years, had an intimate 
knowledge of the layout of the settlements and had even conducted its own survey of the settlements 
previously. When the DDA surveyors began the survey process, DSS workers recognized that the 
categories of eligibility for resettlement; the assumptions about the identity, legality and history of the 
residents; and the calculative practices used by the government would not only require residents to accept 
resettlement as a best-case scenario, but would also lead to the displacement of most residents without 
resettlement (due to their ineligibility).  
 The DSS thus undertook two political actions. First, it directly intervened in the DDA survey 
process by following surveyors around and challenging the accuracy of their assessment of the ground 
reality. If a hut was locked and the DDA surveyor was on the verge of omitting it from the survey 
register, DSS workers told them who the resident was, for how long s/he had been living there, and 
confirmed this information from the neighbours. If surveyors wanted a truly accurate assessment, the 
workers told them, they would have to trust local knowledge or return later to re-assess the status of the 
hut. This increased the administrative burden of the survey. DSS workers also convinced the surveyors to 
record all residents, even those who did not have residence proof or whose proof was dated after the 
resettlement cut-off date (of 1990). Slum surveyors always rely on some amount of local knowledge, at 
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least to get the lay of the land before initiating a survey. In this case, those local ‘helpers’ countered the 
legitimacy of the survey and declared the survey process inaccurate and insufficient to determine the 
eligibility of the residents. 
 Second, the DSS undertook a counter-survey by enumerating all the huts within the two slums. In 
addition to doing the slum survey ‘better,’ DSS workers went further by listing the number of family 
members and the names of the head of household of each generation (if any) leading back to the family’s 
arrival in the settlement, recording the hut’s precise location on a map of the slum, making copies of the 
relevant residence proof regardless of that proof’s date, affixing past voter logs to the survey to show that 
the residents were deeply connected with the electoral process, attaching school records of children, 
copying letters from government officials and elected representatives who had approved the extension of 
services (the construction of a toilet block and dispensary) to the slums, and appending notarized, 
government documents proving that the slums’ earliest residents had been brought to Delhi and settled 
by government contractors as workers to build the surrounding residential colony. All of this information 
was assembled in an attempt to prevent the erasure of the complex history that led to the slums’ present.  
 Fifty DSS members then delivered this counter-survey to the Commissioner of Land Management 
in the main DDA office, located above the district office that conducted the slum survey. They also 
submitted written and verbal accusations that DDA surveyors had requested and accepted bribes from 
residents in order to be added to the register and that the DDA survey did not even include all of the 
households.  
 The counter-survey, on the one hand, challenged the calculative practices of the DDA on its own 
terms by demonstrating the DDA’s inaccurate assessment of the slums. If the Account’s Branch of the 
Land Department of the DDA is supposed to ‘maintain Ledgers of Accounts of the encroachers Estate-
wise’ (DDA, 1982: 115), the DSS showed how this task had not been accurately completed. On the other 
hand, the counter-survey challenged the overall calculative foundation of government by questioning the 
metrics used to assess the identity of slum dwellers, the type of improvement (i.e. resettlement) they 
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could be eligible to receive, and the basis on which that eligibility would be determined (the 1990 cut-off 
date). The DSS counter-survey showed that the people living on these plots are not ‘illegal encroachers’ 
or ‘criminals,’ but ‘workers’ and ‘city-builders.’ 
 Going one step further, the DSS aligned with a network of slum organizations called Sajha Manch 
(Joint Platform) and received technical assistance from professional non-governmental organization 
workers to show that the DDA had failed on its own terms to account for and accommodate the 
population growth anticipated and planned for in the Delhi Master Plan. They claimed (to the DDA and 
media) that this was a political, not a technical or implementation, failure by comparing (i) the Master 
Plan’s guideline for low-income housing provision for the year 2001 with (ii) the actual housing stock 
built by the DDA.xxiv The DDA had failed to provide even 15% of the required stock (cf. Verma, 2002), 
a fact the DSS used to question who should be termed ‘illegal,’ slum dwellers or the government. By re-
asserting the legal entitlements guaranteed to the poor through plans laid down in the pre-liberalization 
past and demonstrating the calculative errors of the DDA survey, the DSS (armed with its own ‘accurate’ 
surveys and numerical representations) countered the DDA’s claim to exclusive, expert knowledge of 
slums. 
 Raising the threat of DDA corruption in the media and armed with its own claim to accuracy, the 
DSS threw its own ‘web of visibilities, of public codes and private embarrassments over’ (Rose, 1999: 73) 
the calculations of government. The result of the DSS’s calculative counter-conduct was that the slum 
survey was suspended and the demolition order was withdrawn.  
 Recent studies have emphasized the general methodological importance of the politics of 
calculation within the exercise of governmental power (see Elden, 2007; Legg, 2006a). Numerous 
governmentality studies have also suggested that the knowledge formed through governmental 
technologies can be ‘repossessed’ by ‘the governed’ to contest the terms of rule (Kalpagam, 2000; Rose, 
1999: 92), or, as Gordon (1991: 5) says, ‘the terms of governmental practice can be turned around into 
focuses of resistance.’ Yet, these studies examine this politics almost exclusively through internal debates 
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among the ‘governors’ or within an encompassing rationality of rule—that is, as a process internal to rule 
in which ‘the constitutive role of contestation drops out of sight’ (Hart, 2004: 93; see also Joyce, 2003: 
102-3; O'Malley, Weir, & Shearing, 1997). Governmental knowledge, in this view, can activate politics 
and be used for different strategic ends, but this happens only after this knowledge has already been 
established as ‘truth.’ These studies therefore do not consider how (counter-) tactics among the governed 
can change the strategies of government, or how calculative practices can themselves become sites of 
struggle. The DSS counter-survey, like other examples from the counter-mapping literature (see 
Appadurai, 2002; Peluso, 1995; Turnbull, 1998), provides insight into how these tactics can shape (at 
least temporarily) larger strategies of rule and shows that the calculative practices of government are not 
politically inert, but rather can be contested so as to reconfigure the character of governmentality.  
 
V. The rise of an aesthetic normativity  
 
 The unruliness of slum space by the early 2000s arose, as shown above, because of technical 
difficulties in producing a governing intelligibility through existing calculative practices on the one hand, 
and the politicization of those calculative practices on the other. By this time, the courts had already 
intervened to try to reassert the existing accuracy-based calculative framework of government, but with 
little success. With mounting pressure from commercial investors and the ‘normal,’ middle-class public to 
make Delhi look ‘world-class,’ the DDA and MCD turned to the courts to identify new strategies to 
ensure these ends. For example, the MCD submitted in the High Court that the problem of 
unauthorized constructions and slums is ‘mammoth in nature - and cannot be controlled by simply 
dealing under the existing laws or under the provisions of [Delhi's] master plan’ (Biswas, 2006). Here we 
see that government, in a moment of crisis, called upon the sovereign mechanism of law to impose order 
by any means necessary (cf. Schmitt, 2006)—in this case, by recalibrating legality and establishing a new 
calculative foundation of rule.xxv 
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 The courts, through a series of decisions in the early 2000s, declared the existing procedures of 
governing slums too slow and inefficient to make Delhi world-class and slum-free. In a 2002 decision, 
the court stated ‘it would require 272 years to resettle the slum dwellers’ according to existing procedures 
and that the ‘acquisition cost… of land… and development… would be Rs. 4,20,00,00,000/- [~USD 100 
million].’xxvi This set of conditions was clearly intolerable, so the court began relying less heavily on the 
previously dominant (and statutory)—but slow, inefficient, expensive, and contestable—calculative 
procedure of surveying slums. Instead, it started using a surrogate indicator to identify illegality: the ‘look’ 
or visual appearance of space.xxvii In lieu of accurately assessing (i.e. creating paper re-presentations that 
correspond to) physical space, a set of visual determinants began to be used to render slums intelligible 
and locate them within a new ‘grid of norms’: a world-class aesthetic defined by the DDA and Delhi 
Government’s prioritization of making Delhi a ‘world-class’ city.  
 As part of Delhi’s world-class city-building efforts, public finances in the early 2000s were gradually 
shifted away from education, public housing, healthcare, and food subsidies toward large, highly visible 
and ‘modern’ infrastructure projects like the Delhi Metro Rail, more than 50 new flyovers, two new toll 
roads to Delhi’s posh, satellite cities, and the Commonwealth Games Village—prestige projects built ‘to 
dispel most visitors’ first impression that India is a country soaked in poverty’ (Ramesh, 2008). Similarly, 
the Delhi Government approved more than USD 100 million (which it later retracted after cost estimates 
almost doubled) for building a ‘signature bridge’ modelled after London’s Tower Bridgexxviii and the 
municipal government liberalized building bye-laws and development norms to allow for denser and 
taller (i.e. more ‘modern’) commercial development across the city. Along the same lines, various ‘world-
class’ monuments (e.g. the world’s largest Hindu complex, the Akshardham Temple) and commercial 
developments (e.g. India’s biggest shopping mall complex) in direct violation of the city’s land use plan 
were deemed ‘planned’ and legal in order to facilitate Delhi’s ascent as a site of India’s biggest and best 
architectural feats.  
 With the Chief Minister of Delhi declaring the preparations for the 2010 Commonwealth Games 
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the government’s top priority and a frenetic buzz in the media since the early 2000s to ensure that 
Delhi’s appearance is appropriately ‘global’ before the Games, a shared aesthetic sense of how the city 
should look quickly took shape. This has been enhanced by the general celebration of middle-class 
consumptive lifestyles and spaces in the media as well as public campaigns by trade associations, the 
media and government (often in partnership) aimed at creating the perception that Delhi will look like 
London or Singapore in the near future (Dupont, 2006). This ‘world-class’ aesthetic became more than 
media hype or city boosterism, however, when the courts began tying ‘law and order’ to it; it soon 
became both ‘the end and instrument of government’ (Foucault, 2007: 105).  
 In the early 2000s, the courts began making widespread mention of Delhi as a ‘showpiece’, ‘world-
class’, ‘heritage’, and ‘capital’ city. In a landmark judgment from 2000, the Supreme Court stated,  
 
In Delhi, which is the capital of the country and which should be its showpiece, 
no effective initiative of any kind has been taken by the numerous governmental 
agencies operating there in cleaning up the city…. Instead of ‘slum clearance’ 
there is ‘slum creation’ in Delhi. This in turn gives rise to domestic waste being 
strewn on open land in and around the slums. This can best be controlled at least, 
in the first instance, by preventing the growth of slums.xxix  
 
In 2001, the Delhi High Court made the barriers to Delhi’s world-class ambitions equally clear: ‘Delhi 
being the capital city of the country, is a show window to the world of our culture, heritage, traditions 
and way of life. A city like Delhi must act as a catalyst for building modern India. It cannot be allowed to 
degenerate and decay. Defecation and urination cannot be allowed to take place in open at places which 
are not meant for these purposes.’xxx Here, the obstacle to Delhi becoming a ‘catalyst’ of modernity is the 
nuisance-causing activities (e.g. open defecation) of slum dwellers (for whom the state has failed to 
provide adequate infrastructure for enclosed latrines).  
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 Court documents from this period show that the growing concern for the city’s ‘world-class’ 
appearance increasingly came to be expressed through an environmental discourse of cleanliness and 
pollution (cf. Baviskar, 2003). Popularized through the phrase and public campaign called ‘Clean Delhi, 
Green Delhi,’ this discourse tied deficiencies in environmental well-being and appearance to the presence 
of slums, largely through the legal category of ‘nuisance.’ Before 2000, nuisance-causing activities like 
open defecation or unhygienic living conditions did not provide sufficient justification for demolishing a 
slum. Through the 1980s and 1990s, unsanitary conditions in slums and general slum-related public 
nuisances were legally considered the responsibility and fault of the municipal authorities: slums were 
dirty because the state did not provide them with basic services. However, as I have argued elsewhere 
(Ghertner, 2008), the early 2000s introduced a new legal discourse of nuisance that reconfigured the 
parameters and mechanisms by which slum-related nuisances were to be remedied.  
 The juridical category of ‘nuisance’ is broadly considered any ‘offense to the sense of sight, smell, 
or hearing’ (Ashok K. Jain, 2005) and is as such directly linked with aesthetic norms. The definition of 
public nuisance, according to statute and precedent, had until this time included only particular objects 
possessed or actions performed by individuals or groups that interfered with a public right. Aesthetically 
displeasing, annoying, or dangerous actions or objects could only be addressed by improving municipal 
services or fining individuals for their violation.xxxi  
 The inability of the DDA and MCD to improve, clean up, or remove slums, as well as the court’s 
failure to efficiently provide order to the city by removing slums through existing Acts, led to a gradual 
reinterpretation of nuisance that made the appearance of filth or unruliness in and of itself a legitimate 
basis for demolishing a slum. This change took place by redefining the categories of nuisance such that 
not only objects or actions, but also individuals and groups themselves could be declared nuisances. This vastly 
expanded the range of procedures that could be administered to remove nuisance: no longer by stopping 
nuisances through imposing fines and penalties, but by displacing entire populations.  
 Once the interpretation of nuisance was expanded to include categories of people or particular 
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population groups, the legal (and calculative) basis for slum demolition was simplified. Demolition orders 
no longer require complex mapping and survey exercises to determine the nature of land use or demand 
even the confirmation of land ownership in slum cases. Today, courts ask for little more than the 
demonstration by a petitioner (who is usually a neighbouring property owner) that the slum in question is 
(i) on public land (which is the definition of ‘slum’ and has never been a sufficient condition for 
demolition orders in the past), and (ii) a nuisance to the public. Evidentially, this is most commonly and 
effectively done by furnishing photographs that show the slum’s ‘dirty’ look and poor environmental 
conditions: open defecation, overcrowded living conditions, children playing in and ‘taking over’ the 
street, stagnant water, municipal waste, etc. Since approximately 2002, the courts have considered such 
photographs sufficient evidence to confirm that the slum in question does not conform to the aesthetic 
and civic codes deemed ‘normal’ in Delhi and have, in the majority of such cases, issued demolition 
orders. Today in Delhi, the look of the slum alone confirms its illegality, and the calculative practices of 
producing expert knowledge of a population group now consists of a judge’s aesthetic judgment of that 
group’s contribution to the overall security and vitality of the city (Ghertner, 2008). 
 Over the past ten years, close to a million slum dwellers have been displaced in Delhixxxii, the vast 
majority thanks to court orders equating slum clearance with environmental and visual clean up. This 
new aesthetic ordering of the city, in which the legality and essential features of space can be determined 
entirely from a distance and without requiring accurate survey or assessment (i.e. space can be calculated 
without numbers), marks a clear shift from the previous scientific/statistical calculative foundation of 
rule. In this new, more aesthetic calculative framework, the law, in conjunction with a variety of other 
aesthetic and security techniques (including the slum survey, discussed again below), crafts fields of 
intelligibility by disseminating standardized aesthetic norms. Spaces are known to be illegal or legal, 
deficient or normal based on their outer characteristics. A shopping mall, even if in violation of planning 
law, is legal because it looks legal.xxxiii A slum, even if its residents have been formalized at their current 
location, is illegal because it looks like a nuisance. As a ‘social vision’ then, law ‘defines our idea of 
Gheter, D.A. (2010). ‘Calculating without numbers,’ Economy and Society 39(2): 185-217. 
 24 
discursive relevancy, positing distinct epistemological criteria for verification’ (Singer, cited in Blomley, 
1994, 12-13), in this case, aesthetic norms. As of approximately 2000 then, the manner in which slum 
space is rendered intelligible—that is, the system of verification used to deem the representation, or 
picture, of the slum truthful—shifted away from the statistical procedures described above to an 
aesthetic evaluation. 
This new regime has made ensuring security in the city administratively and technically less 
complex than before because it provides a clear visual grid for assessing the quality of space without 
requiring the rigorous inscriptive/statistical simplifications previously necessary to render such ground 
conditions easily intelligible. In the context of urban government, Foucault describes the security 
imperative’s primary focus as ‘a matter of organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, 
making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing 
the bad’ (2007: 18). The law’s ability to clear unruly and displeasing spaces through this less technically 
rigorous calculative regime has accelerated the circulation of what Delhi’s governors consider 
aesthetically and economically ‘good.’ Thus, unlike the first moment of urban improvement described 
above, in which the law set the conditions for the slum survey to guide slum dwellers toward improved 
ends, today the law itself has become the main instrument of improvement. Law in this configuration 
thus takes on an affective power, inhering a security dimension through its ability to perpetuate and 
codify the ‘world-class’ aesthetic.xxxiv However, the law—a juridical mechanism—is ill-equipped to 
directly access the ‘mechanics of interest’ (e.g. the desire for resettlement among slum dwellers) 
(Foucault, 2007: 352), the ‘fundamental target and instrument of the government of populations’ (Ibid., 
106). Government must deploy other techniques to ensure that the population’s interest is cultivated in 
the direction of the ‘suitable ends’ of the world-class city. This remains the task of the slum survey, the 
role of which has qualitatively changed in this second moment.  
 
VI. Slum survey as aesthetic technology of government (2000-present) 
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 No longer needed to assess the legality of slums, the slum survey’s previous juridico-legal function 
of knowing and securing the territory has been taken over by the visual technology of nuisance law. I 
attended three slum surveys in 2005-6, during which I observed the surveyors’ limited focus on 
conducting a rigorous physical assessment of the land and much stronger emphasis on instructing the 
slum population on its proper ‘place’ in the city. The process of ‘rendering technical’ the ‘slum problem’ 
resembles that of the pre-2000 survey (described in section III) in that it begins by contrasting ‘illegal 
encroachers’ with the ‘normal’ public that lives in formal residential colonies. Surveyors today, however, 
establish the illegality of the slum not in reference to a map or comprehensive register of all residents, but 
rather on the basis of the settlement’s appearance. The chief officer during all three surveys, after 
assembling the residents, began by describing the nature of urban development in Delhi. On one 
occasion, the officer said: 
 
Today Delhi does not look how it used to. In ten years, it won’t look like it does 
today. Delhi is developing. It is cleaning up. Only the best people will live in 
Delhi. Soon, there will be no slums here. All the deserving people will stay, but 
everyone else will have to go. The international [Commonwealth] Games are 
coming to Delhi and people from all over the world—America, England, 
Japan—will come here and see our city. We all want Delhi and India’s name to 
grow. Look around; you see the Delhi Metro has come, all these malls have 
come. It is time for Delhi to rise. That is what we all want. Everyone must fit. 
 
The survey thus starts by invoking world-class aesthetics as the desired end of government. Over the 
course of the survey, individual surveyors then locate the slum and households being assessed in relation 
to this norm. For example, one surveyor told an angry resident, ‘In the whole world, no settlement that 
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looks like this is legal,’ and suggested that the resident’s demand to remain settled at his current location 
is at odds with the interests of the rest of the city. ‘Can’t you see that nobody wants this type of slum?” 
he concluded. The slum’s physical conditions thus get tied to a notion of illegality and are, in part, the 
deficiencies of the population that must be corrected. These deficiencies, surveyors either directly stated 
or indirectly intimated, include overcrowding, congestion, unhygienic living conditions, lack of property 
ownership, and other environmental and public health risks that slum dwellers’ ‘illegal’ residency imposes 
on the land.  
 During the course of the survey, surveyors spend as much time narrating the physical traits of the 
slum as they do producing the survey log. The survey thus becomes a type of narrative technique 
through which the surveyors constantly move back and forth between describing the particular slum 
being surveyed and the problems with ‘slums in general.’ For example, one surveyor said to a group of 
women, ‘This area has become a complete [traffic] jam. Delhi can’t function like this. Sarkar 
[government] will improve these areas, and you. Everyone will benefit. Look at Kali Basti [a nearby slum 
that had been resettled years earlier]. They have become such good people and the area is clean now.’ 
The survey thus operates by instilling a set of observational practices into the slum population. By 
constantly pointing to the aesthetic impropriety of the slum (‘this area has become a complete jam’) and 
referencing slum deficiencies to the aesthetic norm established by law, the survey process trains slum 
dwellers to see slum space through lenses provided by government. 
 In its current form, the slum survey is not just about making individual slums visible, bounded 
and calculable. It is also about taking easily identifiable, visual attributes of slums and linking those 
attributes to a particular normative category of space—illegal encroachment. A clear effect of the slum 
survey is that it makes use of what slum dwellers already know about the slum—that it is dirty, 
congested, kachcha (constructed in a ‘temporary’ fashion), unserviced, on public land, different from 
private residential colonies—to produce a vision of slum space as illegal and lacking the characteristics 
necessary for ‘normal’ citizenship. This makes slums knowable through their outer, visible characteristics. 
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Spaces that look like slums, that look dirty and overcrowded, are learned to be illegal, despite their far 
more complex political, residential and legal histories. Thus, participants in the slum survey learn a way of 
seeing and identifying the essential traits of urban space and are, in the process, trained to conceptually 
link locations in the city that share these same traits. That is, ‘slum space’ across the city, as a category, is 
rendered imaginable and intelligible through the survey. By offering resettlement in conjunction with 
producing this vision of slum space, the survey shows slum dwellers that the government is attempting to 
improve this category of space; that individual slum dwellers are part of a larger deficient population 
whose improvement is necessary for the city’s improvement; and that it is in their interest to cooperate 
with this process. This ‘will to improve’ (Li, 2007) is induced, as Rose says, ‘by throwing a web of 
visibilities, of public codes and private embarrassments over personal conduct: we might term this 
government through the calculated administration of shame’ (Rose, 1999: 73). In Delhi, the only difference is that 
this personal conduct is not an individual act or particular type of ‘deficient’ behaviour; it is a status of 
being. Being a slum dweller in and of itself is criminalized and denigrated through this governmentality. 
As one man responded when I asked him during the course of the survey why his home will be 
demolished: ‘Because we are dirty and make the city look bad…. Nobody wants to step out of his home 
and see us washing in the open or see our kids shitting.’  
Participating in the slum survey requires slum dwellers’ active self-identification as ‘illegal.’ 
Waiting in line, being compliant with government officers and pleading with them to register your name, 
displaying your residence proof and being observed and inspected, accepting that the procedure and 
timing of your home’s demolition is something you neither control nor have a right to influence, and 
accepting your displacement as a gift from the government are all subjectifying practices that guide slum 
residents’ desires in clear, predictable ways. As Dean says of the way in which the population’s ‘identity’ 
becomes a key target of governmental practice: ‘Regimes of government do not determine forms of 
subjectivity. They elicit, promote, facilitate, foster and attribute various capacities [in the case of the slum 
survey, the capacity to be resettled], qualities [supplicatory, dirty] and statuses [illegal] to particular agents 
Gheter, D.A. (2010). ‘Calculating without numbers,’ Economy and Society 39(2): 185-217. 
 28 
[slum dwellers]. They are successful to the extent that these agents come to experience themselves 
through such capacities…, qualities…  and statuses…’ (1999: 32). Therefore, as slum dwellers participate 
in the survey, identify resettlement as a best-case-scenario—that is, as they accept voluntary displacement 
as a desirable outcome—and adopt world-class aesthetics as their rationalization of change, they occupy a 
subject-position—i.e., they ‘subject’ themselves (Foucault, 1983) to the meaning of world-class aesthetic 
discourse—that sees slums as out of place, as dirty, as illegal. Forced resettlement, through the slum 
survey, hence comes to be seen not as the violent limit of sovereign power, but as the necessary action of 
an improving government. Li (2007: 12) says a key difference between sovereignty and governmentality is 
that in the former violence can be used with impunity, whereas in the latter violence must be justified by 
a notion of improvement. In Delhi now, most slum dwellers see displacement as improvement (at least 
of the city, if not of the self), even in cases when they are unsure of their eligibility for resettlement. As a 
result, heavy resistance to slum surveys and demolition drives are rare in Delhi today, as most slum 
residents are resigned to the fact that Delhi will be ‘slum-free’ in the near future.xxxv  
And, if slum residents do not initially accept the improving mission conveyed through the slum 
survey and deny that they are encroachers (and thus challenge the grounds of the survey) on the basis of, 
for example, the fact that government officials or politicians wilfully settled them at their present 
locations, the surveyors can resort to the authority of the law, forcing resident to choose to self-identify 
as illegal and committed to the resettlement process or be demolished without compensation. The law, 
whether invoked explicitly or implicitly, hence structures the discursive field so that only certain actions 
appear possible: slum demolition, forced resettlement, and, more generally, the end of ‘slum life.’ 
Sovereign power is used in this manner to set the conditions for improvement, while the slum survey 
declares ‘slum life’ itself a threat to the vitality and efficiency of the city. Again, government here does 
not have to operate by convincing everyone that resettlement is a desirable end, just enough people to 
quell resistance and render the population manageable. 
Gheter, D.A. (2010). ‘Calculating without numbers,’ Economy and Society 39(2): 185-217. 
 29 
Interviews with slum organizers and residents confirm that the vast majority of slums in Delhi 
have undergone a slum survey along these lines at least once after the original 1990 survey, even when 
the survey is not followed by a demolition.xxxvi This suggests that the slum survey has become a 
consistent governmental technology of shaping and guiding the slum population’s interest. And, that the 
survey is no longer premised on a statistical calculative foundation, but has rather become more of an 
aesthetic technique of disseminating observational dispositions, is confirmed by the fact that a 
comprehensive statistical summary of the size and distribution of Delhi’s slum population has not been 
reported since 1998. The government itself is unaware of the total number of slums in Delhi and thus 
continues to report 1998 numbers as if they were valid today (Dupont, 2008: 83). In fact, most official 
land use numbers are outdated, blatantly inaccurate, or never recorded in Delhi. For example, in a 2005 
interview with the Commissioner of Planning in the DDA, in which I asked how the statutorily 
mandated baseline land use survey for the newly drafted Master Plan was conducted, he said ‘we didn’t 
do a survey. Well, we did a “windshield survey”: I sent some engineers out in cars and had them look and 
see how things were…. If people knew we were measuring them, things would get too political. We 
know what needs to be done without having to survey.’xxxvii This scarcity of numbers and maps in Delhi 
is what led me to study the slum survey process in the first place. It was therefore no surprise to me in 
observing surveys in 2005-2006 that land-use maps and statistical summaries were virtually absent. A 
former special consultant with the Slum Wing of the MCD, which conducts its own surveys of slums on 
its land, told me that ‘Survey and land-use numbers are concocted. If you survey a slum a second time 
the numbers will come out totally different.’xxxviii The slum survey, and land use planning in Delhi more 
generally, clearly does not rest on ‘mechanically objective’ or ‘scientifically rational’ survey procedures, 
nor does it capture an accurate summary of the land, today. 
This change in the slum survey has had significant implications for the politics of calculation. The 
evaluation of slums in the first moment of urban improvement (1990-2000) took place locally: knowledge 
of the territory is assembled as government officials walked through the narrow corridors of slums, a 
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process slum residents could observe and in which they could intervene, as the counter-survey conducted 
by the Delhi Shramik Sangathan (DSS) discussed in Section IV demonstrated. However, the main calculative 
practice of government today is located in the courtroom when a judge assesses the legality of a slum 
through a set of photographs. Calculative practices today therefore require far less ‘translation,’ as Latour 
(1986) calls it, between ‘reality out there’ and ‘reality in here.’ That is, physical space is not being 
accurately/‘objectively’ assessed, and a correspondence between a ‘paper truth’ and ‘reality out there’ is 
passed over in making expert claims. Once the court passes an order, the correspondence between the 
physical space of the slum and the photograph used to depict that slum in the courtroom cannot be easily 
questioned, making governmental calculation less prone to the intrusion of local knowledge and counter-
claims. As a result, attempts to contest the slum survey, as the DSS did through its counter-survey, have 
vastly different effects today than they did in the first moment of urban improvement.  
For example, during a slum survey in April 2006, another slum organization affiliated with DSS 
called Nirman Mazdoor Panchayat Sangam (Association of Construction Worker Committees) conducted a 
counter-survey along the lines of the DSS survey described above. However, after presenting its counter-
survey to government officials, the officials responded by saying, ‘The demolition is based on a court 
order. It is out of our hands.’ Knowledge of the traits of the slum was not based on the physical slum 
survey, so the counter-survey’s claim to accurate knowledge had limited effect because government did 
not itself claim rigorous knowledge of the slum as a basis of authority. The counter-survey’s influence on 
the overall terms of the demolition was that the DDA accepted a more diverse type of residence proof 
(e.g. Nirman-issued identification cards) to confirm the residents’ resettlement eligibility. As a result, it 
provided more residents with the option of resettlement, but the demolition proceeded just the same. 
The counter-survey’s overall effect, then, was not a challenge to the demolition; rather, it facilitated the 
governmental exercise of enumerating the residents and showing them that resettlement was a desirable 
option.  
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For most slum dwellers in Delhi today, resettlement has become not only the most exulted path 
to improvement, but also the only such path for those unable to buy private plots. The increasingly 
powerful hand of the sovereign state in ordering slum demolitions, combined with slum dwellers’ self-
perception as illegal, largely cultivated through the slum survey (among other meansxxxix), has made 
demolition appear inevitable to many. As public housing expenditure has stagnated and liberalization of 
the land market has driven up land prices, other options for increased livelihood and tenure security have 
been gradually removed. As a result, resettlement has been elevated as the primary target of slum life. We 
thus find that the combination of a dominant and imposing aesthetic order in the city and a set of micro-
practices operating on and through individual desires to re-calibrate slum residents’ sense of self and 
place has made the ‘world-class city’ appear in the interest of the greater good, even to many of those 
who will be displaced to make way for its arrival. This is not to say that counter-conduct has disappeared 
or that rule is complete. New forms of aesthetic counter-conduct aimed at challenging the image of the 
world-class city are beginning to emerge in Delhi (including by the DSS, which I will explore in future 
work), but have not yet been able solicit interest in a large enough percentage of the slum population to 
slow the slum removal process. 
To consider more fully how the combination of an imposed aesthetic order and the slum survey 
might guide the population’s interest, and to say something about the epistemological foundation of an 
aesthetic governmentality, I want to take a page from Bernard Cohn’s (1996) classic study of colonial 
knowledge in British India. Inspired by Foucault, Cohn focused on what he called the ‘investigative 
modalities’ used to assemble knowledge and build the imperial capacity to govern. In addition to his 
discussion of a ‘survey modality’ and ‘enumerative modality,’ Cohn found another set of modalities that 
operated more through the cultural domain of habits, tastes and expression than facts and figures. One 
of these, the ‘observational/travel modality,’ provides direct insight into how the imposition of an 
aesthetic order in Delhi today has a governmental effect.  
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As Cohn said, ‘The questions that arise in examining this modality are related to the creation of a 
repertoire of images and typifications that determined what was significant to the European eye’ (6). This 
modality works by providing a narrative for the experience of, or movement through, a given space. It 
creates expectations for how space looks and how it should look. Cohn discussed this primarily in terms 
of establishing set itineraries or patterns of movement for newcomers to India so that they could easily 
comprehend ‘India’ through an already narrated experience (cf. Goswami, 2004: Ch. 3); but this modality 
could also be thought of more broadly as training a particular way of seeing. By providing routine, shared 
experiences of moving in a given space a consistent narrative or set of clear aesthetic markers, this 
technique makes the experience of space itself the inter-subjective epistemological basis for knowing that 
space and its features. When this narrative of moving through and seeing space becomes dominant 
within a population—i.e. when it prompts the viewing public to identify with the state’s vision—then how 
one sees that space becomes the basis for assessing what that space is, positively, and what it should be, 
normatively. That is, seeing becomes a way of knowing because the shared experience of moving and 
living in space becomes a basis of intelligibility; seeing becomes a calculative practice. This is the function 
of the slum survey: it takes hold of a set of aesthetic indicators prescribed by the law and trains slum 
dwellers to see themselves and the space of the city through that aesthetic lens. ‘What is observed and 
reported’ in this process ‘is mediated by particular socio-political contexts as well as historically specific 
aesthetic principles’ (Cohn 1996, 7). Crary (1992) has called this mediation of how the visual field is 
encountered and filtered a ‘technique of the observer,’ or how the observer’s position and way of seeing 
is the outcome of socio-historical processes. Walking through slums with slum dwellers and showing 
them how the state views such spaces trains slum dwellers to ‘see like the state,’ to borrow Scott’s (1998) 
phrase. This, I have argued in this paper, produces definite governmental effects. 
 This ability to provide a normative dimension to seeing, to cultivate an aesthetic normativity in 
the population, forms a distinct calculative foundation of government. As Cohn says, the power to 
‘propound canons of taste’ is ‘among the most significant instrumentalities of rulership’ (10). The 
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prevalence of a powerful, shared aesthetic and narrative of urban improvement in Delhi, which is 
endowed to the slum population (in part) through the slum survey, confirms the significance of seeing 
and standards of taste as a key instrumentality, or calculability, of rule. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have attempted to shed light on a type of technology of power that can be 
considered governmental—in the sense of guiding the conduct of the population from a distance (Rose 
1999)—but which has been largely unaccounted for in the governmentality literature. Foucault found 
‘scientifically rational’ statistics to be ‘the main technical factor’ (2007, 104), or calculative practice, 
undergirding governmental knowledge. This observation has led governmentality scholars to the 
epistemological presumption that ‘To govern a problem requires that it be counted’ (Rose, 1999: 221), 
thus treating Foucault’s historically and geographically specific conclusion about the calculative 
foundation of government as analytically generalizable. Be it the census (e.g. Brown & Boyle, 2000; 
Corbridge, Williams, Srivastava, & Veron, 2005; Dirks, 2001; Murdoch & Ward, 1997), mapping (e.g. 
Hannah, 2000; Joyce, 2003; Legg, 2006a), accounting practices (e.g. Miller & O'Leary, 1987; Miller & 
Rose, 1990), resource statistics (e.g. Agrawal, 2005; Demeritt, 2001), or any host of statistical 
aggregations, empirical studies making use of the governmentality framework often take the 
identification of numbers or other ‘scientific’ depictions of targets of rule as the starting point for their 
analysis. But, few studies have explicitly considered how government operates in the absence of such 
numerical accuracy and ‘scientificity’ (Foucault, 2007: 350). What is to say that numbers necessarily play a 
determining role in producing subjectivity and conducting conduct? What is to say that other forms of 
knowledge do not have greater affective power in producing governmental effects?xl This concern is 
especially relevant in postcolonial contexts given that the technical means to secure accurate statistical 
knowledge are often incomplete in the post-colonial state (Corbridge et al., 2005: 18; Hansen & 
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Stepputat, 2001); or, when such knowledge is gathered, it is often missing, deliberately concealed, forged, 
or unused (see Hull, 2008; Roy, 2004).  
In Foucault’s final lecture of Security, Territory, Population, where he lays out his concluding 
treatment of ‘modern and contemporary governmentality’ (2007: 348), he states, ‘The knowledge 
involved [in this governmentality] must be scientific in its procedures. Second, this scientific knowledge is 
absolutely indispensable for good government. A government that did not take into account this kind of 
analysis… would be bound to fail.’ He continues by saying that ‘government cannot do without the 
consequences, the results, of this science’ (2007: 350-1). Recent empirical studies making use of the 
governmentality framework that find an absence/shortage of numerical accuracy or scientific survey 
techniques similarly conclude that such a lack of scientific knowledge leads to the failure of governmental 
projects, or to general unruliness (e.g. Legg, 2007: Ch. 4). While it may often be the case that the absence 
of, or inability to create, an intelligible summary of governmental targets (e.g. territory, populations, 
illegal ‘elements,’ etc.) through numerical survey leads to a failure to ‘govern from a distance,’ might a 
shortage of numbers, or geometric/’planimetric’ accuracy, give rise to other techniques that provide ‘a 
“calculative” sense of the identity of land’ and population (Pottage, 1994: 371)? Thus, while Smart (2001: 
31) suggests that ‘we need to pay more attention to spaces in which control seems to be conspicuously 
absent, where neglect is more apparent than surveillance,’ I suggest that we also need to pay more 
attention to spaces in which surveillance and monitoring are conspicuously absent, but where control is 
nonetheless achieved. For, Foucault initially contrasted the less rigorous technical requirements of 
governmental knowledge with the more panoptic and comprehensive techniques of disciplinary 
knowledge centred on the precise surveillance of bodies. Governmental knowledge’s epistemological 
difference is its ability to govern while knowing less, to operate at a distance, to conduct individuals’ 
conduct by operating on a scale and summoning categories larger than that of individuals but that 
nonetheless somehow resonate at the scale of everyday life. The epistemology of government, then, 
appears to be marked by a certain ‘unknowing.’ An absence of numerical accuracy or ‘the rule of 
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evidence’ (Foucault, 2007: 350) should, perhaps, be the presumed epistemological condition of 
governmental knowledge. 
 I have explored these issues here by analyzing two different moments of urban improvement in 
Delhi, each with a distinct calculative foundation, but both geared toward educating slum dwellers’ desire 
for voluntary resettlement. Each moment thus shared the governing rationality of producing a ‘slum-free’ 
Delhi, but the technical means of achieving this end differed. The calculative foundation of the first 
moment (1990-2000) was characterized by the ‘scientific’, or ‘mechanically objective’ (Porter, 1995), 
survey of slum space. By collating the complex dynamics of slums into intelligible and easily manageable 
categories—those ‘eligible’ for resettlement and thus improvable, versus those ‘ineligible’—the survey 
aimed to divide the slum population’s interest, reduce the likelihood of resistance, and depict slum 
demolition as a process of urban improvement. However, the slum survey itself became politicized 
through this process, leading to resistance not only to the terms of resettlement, but also to the 
calculative foundation of government. By conducting their own surveys, slum residents engaged in 
calculative counter-conduct, appropriating the calculative techniques of government and turning them 
against the existing governmental rationality.  
In response to slum unruliness in the late 1990s, a new calculative foundation of government 
gave rise. No longer premised on rigorous ‘scientific’ assessment of slum space, government would know 
and assess space based on outward visual appearance alone. Through a rise of juridical power, in 
particular the law of nuisance, a new aesthetic norm—which I have called ‘world-class’ aesthetics—was 
established, against which urban space could be evaluated from a distance. Now, if a space looks polluting 
and dirty, regardless of its formal legality or relationship to the Master Plan, nuisance law deems it illegal. 
In contrast, spaces that positively portray Delhi in its world-class pursuits (e.g. shopping malls), even if 
statutorily illegal and in violation of the Master Plan, are deemed legal. Bypassing the need for rigorous 
physical survey, government in this second moment (~2000-) assigned the slum survey a new role: 
aesthetically training slum residents to read the territory through world-class aesthetics.  
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That affect plays a central role in shaping power, that the ability to govern from a centre (i.e. the 
state) is bound to the ability to tell stories or put on displays that evoke favourable responses within—or 
impart subjunctive imaginaries to—‘the governed,’ and that myth and rumour are invoked to authorize 
authority (e.g. Amin, 1984; Taussig, 1997) are all well known. Yet, the governmentality framework has 
not seriously considered how these modes of governing are incorporated into governmental programs, 
which, in my view, has confined its applicability and rendered it distant from the experience of everyday 
life, and thus the stage on which governing rationalities gain meaning. By showing that a type of aesthetic 
governmentality can be equally or more effective than ‘governing by numbers’ (Rose, 1991), I have 
attempted to take preliminary steps toward a more historically and geographically specific treatment of 
the epistemology of government.  
Thus, while the Delhi case shows an instance of the supersession of a statistical mode of 
government by a more aesthetic one—a pattern we might expect to see in other contexts marked by 
contestation over government statistics/maps and a strong normative sense of improvement (be it 
preparation for an international event (e.g. the Olympics), postcolonial anxiety about ‘catching up’, or 
urban entrepreneurialism)—this mode, like any other, has its own calculative risks and vulnerabilities. 
Government in Delhi today rests on the continued ability to produce subjects whose interests align with 
the vision of a world-class city, only now it relies on a general aesthetic sense of improvement more than 
‘mechanically objective’ criteria for classifying urban space. Thus, while it is less prone to the intrusions 
of local counter-claims and disputes over the procedures of classification, if alternative aesthetic visions 
of Delhi are popularized, or if the promise of resettlement no longer adequately manages slum residents’ 
aversion to displacement, then the legitimacy of slum demolitions will undoubtedly be called into 
question, requiring another shift in the calculative foundation of government at the very least, if not 
deeper shifts in the rationality of rule.  
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Notes:
                                                 
i For more on government as ‘the conduct of conduct,’ see Foucault (2007). See also Gordon (1991) and Rose (1999).  
ii See Ramanathan (2005) for an elaboration of how slums are defined in law. 
iii Okhla Factor Owner’s Association vs. GNCTD (Delhi High Court, 2002), Civil Writ Petition 4441/1994, final judgment, 
paragraph 18.  
iv Throughout this paper, I will refer to the sovereign, disciplinary and security dimensions of government, the three modes of 
power that triangulate within any governmental regime. In his first lecture in Security, Territory, Population, Foucault uses the 
example of town planning to show the different strategic functions of each of these modes. The goal of sovereign power, in 
the context of ‘the town,’ is to secure control over the territory: ‘ a good sovereign… is someone well placed within the 
territory, and a territory that is well policed in terms of obedience to the sovereign is a territory that has a good spatial layout’ 
(Foucault, 2007: 14). As a disciplinary instrument, planning operates by imposing a hierarchical distribution of elements 
through zoning. It thus does not start by thinking of the town as the centre or capital of the territory, which is the approach of 
sovereign power, but rather on the basis of a hierarchical and geometric figure used to ensure that spaces and components of 
the city are functionally efficient and in their proper place. The security dimension of planning focuses on facilitating the 
circulation of ‘what is good’ and reducing what is ‘bad’ through programs to increase the well-being of the population (e.g. 
sanitation and hygiene campaigns). Its goal is not perfection, as is the case with the disciplinary model, but of maximizing the 
positive elements within the town. 
v For Porter (1995), mechanical objectivity consists of the repetition of standardized procedures of measurement, 
demarcation, quantification, and reportage that are typically required when the subjective discretion/judgment of ‘experts’ is 
questioned. Mitchell too describes how it is through a well-defined set of procedures that objectivity is established: ‘The 
performance of the law will gain its authority from following this particular sequence of acts [granting land, survey of 
boundaries, placing of boundary stones, recording of measurements…]’ (2002: 58).  
vi This information is compiled based on DDA survey instructions, DDA Annual Reports describing survey outcomes, and 
interviews with DDA staff in 2005 about slum surveys in this period. 
vii MCD. 2002. Annual Report of the Slum and JJ Wing, 2001-2002. 
viii The slum re-housing that took place in the 1980s was called ‘resettlement,’ whereas by the mid-1990s it was formally called 
‘relocation.’ The terms and reasons behind such re-housing differed, with the latter carrying weaker tenure rights, but the 
point here is that slum dwellers in the post-1990 scenario did not recognize this distinction and saw contemporary relocation 
programs through the lens of the positive experience of earlier slum re-housing programs. Slum residents and government 
officials use the same word in Hindi (punarvas) to describe both types of re-housing. 
ix Resettlement plots are now 12.5 or 18 m2 in size, depending on the date of one’s residence proof, whereas they were 50 m2 
in the 1970s. Unlike old resettlement colonies located within the city limits, current resettlement plots are typically more than 
30 kilometres away from residents’ original jobs and homes, have access to far fewer public services than slums, have few local 
job prospects, come with mere five year residency licenses (far less secure than ownership or a lease), and have grave health 
and environmental conditions (see Menon-Sen & Bhan, 2008). 
x These observations are based on survey instructions from this period, conversations with DDA surveyors in 2005 about 
their past experiences conducting slum surveys, and interviews with slum residents surveyed in the 1990s. 
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xi Tata Consultancy Services. (1986). Delhi Development Authority Organizational Review Study, Vol. 1 Proposed Management Information 
System, pg. 4.6.  
xii Ibid.: 4.2-4.4. 
xiii See note 3. 
xiv Affidavit filed by Under Secretary, Ministry of Urban Development & Poverty Alleviation in the High Court of Delhi, 
CWP 2253/2001. 
xv One indication of this shift toward the judiciary is that by 2000 the courts were responsible for ordering almost all of 
Delhi’s slum demolitions, whereas before that the decision to raze a slum was the almost exclusive domain of the concerned 
land-owning agency (Ramanathan, 2006). 
xvi Pitampura Sudhar Samiti versus Government of India, CWP 4215/1995 (Delhi High Court), order dated May 26, 1997. 
xvii Ibid., final judgment. 
xviii Ibid., order dated May 26, 1997.  
xix See note 3, paragraph 24. 
xx Sewa Hotel and Resorts vs. DDA (Delhi High Court), CWP 15115/2004, paragraph 13.  
xxi For example, see the order dated February 16, 2001 in Samudayik Vikas Samiti vs. Government of India (Delhi High 
Court), CWP 6553/2000. 
xxii This is a component of what is regarded as ‘judicial activism’: when the judiciary takes over decisions that fall within the 
domain of the legislature or executive (e.g., see ‘Court steps on MCD turf’, The Times of India, New Delhi, March 24, 2006). 
xxiii Civil Misc. Petition 6982/2007 (Dayavanti & Ors.) in CWP 4582/2003 (Delhi High Court). 
xxiv The Report of the Committee on Problems of Slums in Delhi, constituted by the Planning Commission, Government of 
India, June 2002, confirms this finding: ‘DDA claims that 20% of the residential area [of Delhi] is earmarked for Economically 
Weaker Sections/squatter population under the integrated development project. DDA has not allotted any land to Slum & JJ 
Department [responsible for slum housing] during 1992-97…. Prima facie, the allocation of land for the housing of the urban 
poor has been insufficient to meet the requirements, and below the proportion of their share [provided through the Master 
Plan]’ (29-30). 
xxv Compare this with studies that point to the increased importance of the node of sovereignty in the sovereignty-discipline-
government triangle in (post)colonial contexts (e.g. Legg, 2007; Moore, 2005; Prakash, 1999; Watts, 2003). 
xxvi  See note 3, paragraph 22. 
xxvii Compare with the role of aesthetics in the high-modernist programs explored by Scott (1998, especially Ch. 7). 
xxviii See Hindustan Times, ‘A tale of two bridges’, January 18, 2007. 
xxix Almrita Patel vs. Union of India (Supreme Court), final judgment, Supreme Court Cases 2000 (2): 679, emphasis added. 
xxx CWP 6553/2000 (Delhi High Court), order dated February 16, 2001. 
xxxi See The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 133. 
xxxii Combined demolitions reported by the DDA and Slum and JJ Wing of the Municipal Corporation from 1997-2007 lead to 
the conservative estimate of 710,000 displaced residents. From 2004 onwards, the Slum Wing has reported only households 
that have been resettled, leaving the vast majority of the recently displaced unrecorded. If all demolished households were 
included, this number would likely cross one million. 
xxxiii See ‘SC stays construction in Ridge area in Vasant Kunj’, The Hindu, New Delhi, May 1, 2006. 
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xxxiv This aligns with what Foucault said about the inherent dependency and blurring between sovereign, disciplinary and 
security mechanisms in his first lecture of Security, Territory, Population: ‘… getting these systems of security to work involves a 
real inflation of the juridico-legal code’ (2007: 7). 
xxxv This was a sentiment conveyed to me frequently throughout my field research. For example, in a 51 person, in-depth 
survey I conducted in a slum in West Delhi in 2007, 40 respondents agreed with the statement “In ten years Delhi will have 
no slums.” 
xxxvi DDA Annual Reports show that, each year, fewer than 10% of the structures surveyed and given notice for encroaching 
public land are demolished. This is because the DDA initiates proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of 
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 only when it intends to use that land for a particular purpose. 
xxxvii Interview with Mr. A.K. Jain, May 26, 2005. 
xxxviii Interview at informant’s office, May 24, 2005. 
xxxix The rise of the new middle class in India’s post-liberalization period (1991-) has been shaped by a politics of visibility and 
display in which codes of behaviour and the quality of physical space acquire heightened discursive and representational 
significance (Fernandes, 2006). The ‘intensified circulation of images of global cities through cinema, television, and the 
internet’ (Chatterjee, 2004: 143); the representation of this new middle class in popular culture and state policy as the model 
citizen of India’s grand, ‘world-class’ future (see Brosius, 2007); and the rapid  capitalization of the built environment all 
contribute to the collective re-imagining of the Indian city. 
xl My aim here is not to deny the power of numbers (or maps) to simplify and centralize knowledge (see Asad, 1994; Hacking, 
1992; Harley, 2001) or the historical significance of statistics/maps in extending new forms of rule (see Barry, Osborne, & 
Rose, 1993), especially in colonial contexts (see Appadurai, 1993; Dirks, 2001; Edney, 1997; Prakash, 1999). Nor is my goal to 
discredit studies that empirically describe how individuals’ desires and populations’ interests are shaped through numbers (e.g. 
Miller & O'Leary, 1987; Miller & Rose, 1990). In section III I showed how the slum survey in Delhi operated precisely in this 
manner through the 1990s. Rather, I have here attempted to consider the dissemination of aesthetic norms as a different type 
of governmental technology. 
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